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1. INTRODUCTION
Following a similar initiative in 2002, Banco de
Portugal organised a conference this year, held on
11 and 12 March, on the theme “Portuguese Eco-
nomic Development in the European Union”.
This article is a summary of the addresses
made in the conference as well as the main guide-
lines for economic policy that can be drawn from
them. This work is highly personal and represents
only the opinion of the writer. There is also no
claim to do justice to the technical details of the
addresses themselves. This article will give more
emphasis to those addresses which have a direct
bearing on policy.
There were 13 addresses (available on www.
bportugal.pt/events/conferences/IIDEP/default.htm)
and they covered a wide range of themes, as di-
verse as “rules on public expenditure” and the
regulatory framework for professions, minimum
state pensions and wage mobility, the lessons to be
drawn from the “40 hours law” and the articula-
tion of sector regulators with the country’s Compe-
tition Authority. Notwithstanding the diversity of
themes, it is possible to separate the addresses into
two main groups. In one, the major concern relates
to control of the level of public expenditure and
how quality in expenditure can be assessed, with
the latter point understood as the best way to
reach the aims at which expenditure was targeted.
In the second group the focus is on how markets
function and are regulated, both for labour and for
goods and services.
What is the relationship between these two
themes and economic development, which was the
purpose of the conference? Tiago Cavalcanti
(“Business Cycle and Level Accounting: The case
of Portugal”) showed that the lower level of pro-
ductivity in Portugal relative to the USA at the end
of the 20th century (46 per cent lower) can be put
down to two factors: less economic efficiency in
the overall use of resources (also known as total
factor productivity) and, to a lesser extent, distor-
tions in the labour market. Economic efficiency is
usually associated with the diffusion of new tech-
nologies, infrastructure quality, market competi-
tion, and the legal and institutional systems. Pub-
lic expenditures provides for goods and services
which have a specific value to consumers but use
resources which would otherwise be available for
consumption and investment. The higher the level
of public expenditure, or the less efficient its use,
the greater the likelihood that the opportunity cost
will be higher than potential benefits. In these cir-
cumstances, any increase in expenditure from
levels which are already high is often compared to
an adverse technological shocks. On the other
hand, labour market distortions are linked to in-
come tax and other factors such as protectionist la-
bour laws which make it difficult to match work-
ers with available jobs and hamper the flow of re-
sources between companies and industries.
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AND EFFECTIVENESS
2.1. Expenditure rules
In certain countries in the EU, such as Holland
and Sweden, there are formal restrictions on pub-
lic expenditure (known as “expenditure rules”)
that are imposed over and above the rules of the
Stability and Growth Pact. This situation, which
seems to be at the centre of attention at the mo-
ment, is somewhat paradoxical, if we look at the
macroeconomic policy instruments that have been
lost as a result of European monetary union. As
António Pinto Barbosa pointed out in the session
dedicated to Budget Policy and Social Security,
this stemmed fundamentally from an “unroman-
tic” view of governments as economic agents with
limited information and their own aims, and these
aims are not necessarily consistent with the “gen-
eral interest” of the community. Democratic re-
gimes have biases in favour of inflation and public
expenditure and frequently use budget variables
with electoral purposes in mind. The path of the
Portuguese budget through the 90s is detailed in
the address given by Álvaro Pina (“Fiscal Policy in
Portugal: Discipline, Cyclicality and the Scope for
Expenditure Rules”) and it gives a very clear illus-
tration of these two factors. Portugal recorded the
biggest rise in public expenditure in the EU (3.4 pp
of GDP) especially marked in primary current ex-
penditure, which grew twice as fast in real terms
as GDP. On top of this, expenditure was strikingly
pro-cyclical. In the light of this evidence, one
should be sceptic of arguments that oppose to
“rules” (or the Pact itself) in the name of economic
stabilisation. The work of Linda and Francisco
Veiga (“Political-Economic Cycles in Portuguese
Municipalities”) is highly eloquent on this point. It
demonstrates how municipal expenditure, above
all in terms of investment, (and above all in the
item “Other buildings and construction”), rises
significantly in an election year and occasionally in
the year before. Municipal councils manoeuvre
economic policy to illustrate their competence at
election time, thus boosting their chances of re-
election.
Expenditure rules allow budgetary discipline
but preserve room for automatic stabilisers to op-
erate, since these function mainly through tax rev-
enue. (Álvaro Pina’s analysis of seven European
countries shows that in Portugal tax revenue has
the strongest pro-cyclical correlation.) The kind of
rule being looked at here is something along the
following lines: “For a horizon of T years, public
expenditure (D) cannot rise above x per cent per
year”. This statement, however, raises a consider-
able number of practical problems regarding the
exact definition of T, D and x.
Pina argues that the rule should have the hori-
zon of every government mandate, with each gov-
ernment legitimately empowered to specify new
values for the framework. António Pinto Barbosa
however, in his comment on the address, argued
against this, on the grounds that there should be a
“constitutional” view, independent of the political
calendar. As for the concept of expenditure, Pina
maintains that D should be limited to the primary
current expenditure of the state sub-sector. Unem-
ployment benefits and public investment should
be excluded. It may well be that leaving out debt
service payments and subsidies causes no prob-
lem, but the same cannot be said for leaving out
local and regional authorities and public invest-
ment (and here the conclusions of Veiga and
Veiga, op. cit. should be borne in mind). While gen-
uine expenditure in terms of capital could well
pay for itself, it is in practice very difficult to calcu-
late the return on each slice of the “expenditure
cake” and thus pick out what is genuinely capital
as opposed to what is current expenditure. If
therefore we leave public investment out of the ex-
penditure frame defined by the rule, we are open-
ing Pandora’s box: the accounting creativity stem-
ming from this would strip out the idea of disci-
pline that the rule seeks to impose. As for the limit
to expenditure growth (x), Pina proposes that
growth be set in real terms (as in Holland) and not
in nominal terms (as in Sweden). The point of ref-
erence should be potential GDP growth (under-
stood as the average of the past decade, if prob-
lems involving measurement are to be avoided).
This real limit would be converted annually into a
nominal figure through application of the GDP de-
flator, laid down or validated by an independent
commission. Arguments here are again divided
but it seems clear that a nominal limit is more
transparent and more stringent, albeit more diffi-
cult to define with all due rigour.
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a putative rule, what seems to be of real impor-
tance is to fix multi-year expenditure objectives. It
is also of primordial importance to provide the
governing and supervisory institutions with the
quality and independence necessary for effective
control over budgetary matters. A fundamental as-
pect of this discipline is also a systematic assess-
ment of public programmes and policies.
2.2. Assessment of public service policies
The efficiency of public expenditure is an issue
that can be seen from different viewpoints. We
can, for example, take a raft of areas where the
state intervenes and where specific policies al-
ready exist. We can then study how state interven-
tion can be made with the least possible waste in
resources. What we are looking at here is funda-
mentally an analysis of the frontiers of efficiency.
Another view consists in assessing to what point
the specific intervention yields the promised social
benefits that are a priori its justification. And from
this angle, we are also looking at who gains and
who loses from the intervention. The two perspec-
tives are of course complementary and are part of
an overall cost/benefit appraisal of public sector
programmes and policies.
There is at our disposal over 30 years of rigor-
ous and scientifically based empirical assessment
of programmes and policies. The large financial
burden that many of them require justifies the
widespread interest in the topic. The address of
Mónica Dias (“The Empirical Evaluation of Social
Programmes”) focused on the methods available
to evaluate public policies. The work of Gouveia
and Farinha and Varejão are (methodologically
varied) examples covering the assessment of spe-
cific interventions such as the minimum state pen-
sion and the “40 hours law”.
Any method of evaluation requires the recre-
ation of the (counterfactual) behaviour in an alter-
native economic scenario following “non partici-
pation in the programme” or if the programme
does not in fact exist. In many areas, such as psy-
chology or medicine, there are routine scientific
assessments the causal effects of specific actions.
Before any medicine is approved for general use, it
must be subject to laboratory experiments in
which patients are selected on a random basis and
are given the drug, while others in a control group
are given an inoffensive substance known as a pla-
cebo.
This kind of experimentation is rare in econom-
ics and other social sciences. Even if it were possi-
ble, it would not provide an assessment of pro-
grammes and policies before they are imple-
mented. (Dias has defined this as a “structural ap-
proach” requiring the use of economic theories to
build “laboratories” which allow for an evaluation
of the reaction of the agents and the effects of the
interventions.) But even without experimental in-
formation, it is possible to carry out assessments of
programmes and policies that have in fact been
implemented. The counterfactual behaviour men-
tioned above can be supplied by external and ex-
ogenous circumstances and this leads to what
could be considered a controlled experiment (nat-
ural or quasi-experiments). We can see common
examples of this in the regional variations that oc-
cur when certain programmes are implemented.
Sometimes it is the passage of time (“before and
after the intervention”) that allows for control
groups to be set up as if a controlled experiment
was being undertaken. José Varejão’s work, (“Re-
duction in the Working Week and Employment:
Lessons of the 40 Hours Law”) provides an illus-
tration of a “natural experiment” since the mea-
sure in question, the law of 40 hours, can be con-
sider an unforeseen factor; the control group will
be the establishments not covered by the obliga-
tion to cut the number of hours; and the experi-
mental group is made up of the comparable estab-
lishments which fall within the scope of the new
law.
Miguel Gouveia and Carlos Farinha (“What
Point Minimum Pensions?”) gave an address that
covers a highly relevant programme. When a pen-
sion provided according to the existing social se-
curity laws is below the minimum requirement, it
is topped up to reach the minimum figure. A big
number of pensioners benefit from this topping
up, which is financed through the country’s state
budget and gives rise to considerable public ex-
penditure. A number of governments have
adopted policies leading to gradual increases in
minimum pensions up to the minimum wage as
part of the fight against poverty. Gouveia and
Farinha show that minimum pensions are an ex-
pensive and inefficient way of reaching this objec-
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household receiving minimum pensions are in fact
below the poverty line (that is, they get an income
below 60 per cent of the average income for an
equivalent adult in active employment). This situ-
ation stems from the fact that pensions are not
given on a “means-tested” basis. So an increase of
pensions from 60 to 70 per cent of the minimum
wage can be expected to lead to very low results in
terms of poverty, since 64 per cent of this rise will
end up being spent on people who are already
above the poverty line.
The fundamental message is that the minimum
wage is a poor reference point for social policy and
there should be an effective means-testing proce-
dure put in its place. The authors provided a sim-
ulation with an alternative programme, where the
real situation of beneficiaries was more rigorously
controlled. The result was that with half of the out-
lay it would be possible to achieve more signifi-
cant advances against poverty. This work therefore
gives us a very clear idea of something that is of-
ten mentioned but not always identified: wastage
in the expenditure of public funds.
Interventions by the government do not always
result in public expenditure, but they always have
an effect on the way resources are allocated.
“Work-share” programmes (reductions in the
maximum limit that a working week can last) have
been popular in Europe since the end of the 70s,
partly in response to high levels of unemploy-
ment. The catchphrase has been “working less so
that everyone can work”. Such measures, however,
have little solid basis in economic theory: there is
an unequivocal rise in labour costs and this is fol-
lowed by a fall in the total number of hours
worked. The effects on employment are, however,
ambiguous and the matter comes down to an em-
pirical issue.
José Varejão’s address (“Reduction in the
Working Week and Employment: Lessons of the 40
Hours Law”) looked at the impact of the law that
brought in a standard 40-hour week in 1996. The
variables analysed were number of hours worked,
overtime, wages and employment. The study
shows that the measure had the predicted effect of
reducing the number of hours worked per estab-
lishment, an increase in overtime and an increase
in the hourly wage rate. As for employment, there
is a wide-ranging picture: in those companies
where the influence of the measure is more
heavily felt or where there is a big proportion of
workers on the minimum wage, employment
clearly falls. In aggregate terms the effect on em-
ployment is slight. As the author points out, at a
time when Europe is moving towards a 35-hour
week, and even if the motives are not strictly eco-
nomic, it is important to bear in mind the real
costs of such a shift.
Pedro Martins and Paulo Guimarães also gave
addresses that have potential relevance for policy-
making, in spite of the fact that neither of them re-
fers to any specific public initiative.
Direct Foreign Investment is usually seen as
having a positive impact on total productivity and
thus on potential for growth in economies. Gov-
ernments compete for it, often at the cost of mean
huge public investments. It is therefore important
to assess the real benefits provided by direct for-
eign investment. Pedro Martins (“Wage Differen-
tials and Wage Spillovers of Foreign Firms: Evi-
dence from Different Estimators”) assesses this
through its effects on salaries. An argument for
this perspective could be the sharing of the gains
from greater productivity of foreign companies.
Foreign companies pay on average 32 per cent
more than domestic companies. However, control-
ling for features such as the educational level of
the work force, the sector and size, those pay dif-
ferences vanish. Does this mean that direct foreign
investment has no impact? Not necessarily. In the
first place, wages may not be the best indicator for
assessing these benefits. Moreover, the characteris-
tics mentioned above that “explain” the wage dif-
ferential, are more frequently associated with for-
eign companies. The advantage of being foreign
may therefore not derive from invisible factors as-
sociated with “residence”, but rather to the facts
that these companies are bigger and employ a
more highly-educated work force.
Political decision makers are often concerned
with the asymmetries in regional distribution of
economic activities and are receptive to pro-
grammes that involve relocation of these activities.
It is therefore of considerable interest to know
which of these initiatives are more likely to be suc-
cessful and which are the economic activities
which are most likely to respond to such initia-
tives. These are the questions that are answered in
the work of Paulo Guimarães and Octávio
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guese Manufacturing Industries”).
This study shows that there is only a small
number of sectors which are highly clustered
(above what would be expected from the mere en-
dowment of resources in a region or from a ran-
dom allocation). In some of these sectors, involv-
ing traditional industries, this clustering stems
from external factors associated with historical
specialisation. Some technologically advanced in-
dustries (for example, radio and television, cars or
pharmaceuticals) are also found in clusters, sug-
gesting the existence of “knowledge externalities”.
For these industries, public incentives for reloca-
tion will only have a modicum of success, or else
the success will demand greater spending. In
terms of areas of intervention, increased accessibil-
ity to the Porto-Lisbon coastal corridor is the most
likely measure to succeed in spreading the eco-
nomic activity throughout the country.
3. MARKETS
3.1. The labour market
The weak dynamics of labour flows both be-
tween companies and between employment and
unemployment in Portugal brings with it high
costs in terms of efficiency (vide Blanchard and
Portugal, 2002). The existence of flexible markets is
fundamental for workers and companies to find
the matchings that make employment more pro-
ductive. Moreover, in a context where the needs
for employment oscillate tremendously, both in lo-
calisation (company, industry or region), and in
skills, it is crucial to have a labour market which
functions efficiently.
The adjustment costs which characterise the
Portuguese labour market imply among other
things longer average unemployment spells and a
higher number of companies which close (as an al-
ternative to reducing manpower). Anabela
Carneiro (“The Economic Consequences of Worker
Displacement in Portugal”) calculates the loss in
wages among individuals who spend periods out
of work following closures. This provides another
measure of the costs associated to unemployment.
The loss of wages is substantial and has an effect
up to 4 years after the episode concerned: wages
are up to 11 per cent less than if the worker had
not lost his or her job. A significant part of this loss
derives from the loss of seniority in the company,
which suggests the destruction of specific human
capital. It is interesting to note that this cut in
wages begins a year before the job loss. Faced with
the risk of closure, workers are prepared to make
concessions on wages. This fact in itself is symp-
tomatic of the lack of fluidity in the market and
the anticipation of a long period out of work.
There are measures that could be taken to rein in
these adjustment costs: an extension to the period
for notification of redundancy and other measures
that increase the possibility of finding new em-
ployment (help with job-searching and profes-
sional training).
Curiously enough, in spite of the rigidity of the
institutions in the labour market, there do seem
that some elements of flexibility spring here and
there, providing ways of responding to the needs
of employers and workers. From this angle, in-
creased mobility becomes especially relevant.
Ana Rute Cardoso (“Wage Mobility in Portu-
gal”) compared wage mobility in Portugal and the
United Kingdom, two economies with different
levels of flexibility. It would be expected that the
more restrictive framework in Portugal would lead
to less wage mobility, i.e. fewer possibilities to
change the relative position in the wage distribu-
tion. In other words, less labour flows between
companies could stultify salary scales. This in fact
does not happen, since Portugal and the United
Kingdom are not very different in terms of mobil-
ity. There is considerable evidence that wage flexi-
bility is high in Portugal, in spite of the lack of mo-
bility (or perhaps because of it). For example, it is
well known that average wages are sensitive to
economic cycles (OECD, 1992) and that employers
manage to adapt salaries that are based on collec-
tive contracts to the specific conditions of the com-
pany and the workers (Cardoso (2000) and
Cardoso and Portugal (2003)). The mobility visible
now reinforces this conclusion, albeit from a dif-
ferent angle.
Francisco Lima (“How much Mobility? Careers,
Promotions and Wages”) looks at other aspects of
mobility, specifically workers transitions between
firms and the gains thus made. A significant num-
ber of jobs are stable and long-term (40 per cent of
workers over 35 have been with their company for
over 10 years) but there is also a high proportion
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terminate in under a year (either on the initiative
of the worker or the employer). This situation re-
lates mainly to young workers and is very often
pejoratively referred to as “precarious”. In prac-
tice, however, leaving a company tends to increase
wages. This is all the more so, the younger and
better educated the worker, and for transitions
which occur to larger companies. From this point
of view, labour mobility may take the place of ca-
reers inside an organisation, and they illustrate the
gains resulting from a good match between em-
ployer and employee.
3.2. Competition
There is a consensus among economists these
days on the importance of institutions for eco-
nomic growth (in this context, see Tavares, 2000).
Which of these are important and the reasons for
their importance are more open to debate. An ex-
ception can clearly be made in the existence of in-
dependent regulators who stimulate and defend
competition in markets. The two addresses pre-
sented to the conference on this theme do not ap-
proach the issue in a general and abstract way.
They look at specific institutions in Portugal — the
Competition Authority and the Professional Asso-
ciations — and they look at which structure best
stimulates competition.
Pedro Barros and Steffen Hoernig (“Sectoral
Regulators and the Competition Authority: Which
Relationship is best?”) come to the conclusion that
the overlapping of jurisdiction between entities
concerned with specific sectors and the Competi-
tion Authority (which covers all sectors) may be
beneficial for encouraging social well being, but
there should be limits to the cooperation between
them. In particular, there should not be a process
of joint decision-making that means that a decision
is only reached if both authorities are in agree-
ment.
Nuno Garoupa (“Regulation of Professions in
Portugal: A Case Study in Rent-Seeking”) looks at
how good is the regulation by two entities that are
in practice the regulators of the sector: the Law-
yers and the Physicians Associations. The regula-
tion of professional activities could be based on
objectives that are “in the public interest” (as a re-
sult of the asymmetry of information, for exam-
ple). Many of the norms that act as regulatory de-
vices are, however, merely of private interest, that
is the wish to increase the income of established
professionals. In the first category, there are, for
example, the guarantees of adequate specialist
training; in the second there are the restrictions on
fees or the disciplinary powers that are exclusive
to the Associations. The author has built an index
of the quality of regulation and found that in the
case of the medical profession, Portugal is the EU
country where norms motivated by private inter-
est are the most predominant. In the case of law-
yers, although belonging to the group with lower
regulatory quality, Portugal is not substantially
different from Germany or France in this regard.
The study proposes various reforms. In terms
of eliminating “restrictions to entry”, I would
point out the opening of the Portuguese legal mar-
ket to international groups or, for the medical pro-
fession, a reduction in the influence of the Associa-
tion in the process of academic training and the
stimulation of competition between the medical
faculties so as to give a significant boost to the
number of doctors. Finally, the author proposes
that the Associations should be within the jurisdic-
tion of the Competition Authority, where restric-
tive practices could be detected.
4. CONCLUSIONS
In the 1st Banco de Portugal conference on eco-
nomic growth in 2002, there were general recom-
mendations regarding policies, focusing on the
bases for economic growth, such as, for example,
the need for investment in infrastructures, improv-
ing the education system, making the labour mar-
ket more flexible and reforming the legal system
and practices.
This, the 2nd conference, looked at more specific
aspects of growth. In terms of the policy conclu-
sions which can be drawn, they can be summa-
rised as two main ideas:
1. The actions of governments must not be
viewed naively. Their intervention is not always
motivated by “the idea of common good”, or nec-
essarily generates net positive benefits. This is true
in macro economic policy and it is enough to look
at the evidence presented to the conference on the
way public expenditure evolution amplifies the ef-
fects of cyclical fluctuations in the economy or on
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cal authorities. This is also true for specific pro-
grammes and policies: the minimum pensions
scheme was shown at the conference to be an inef-
fective instrument in the fight against poverty.
There was also the evidence relating to the cost in
working hours and consequently in production
stemming from the 40 hours law approved in
1996.
Two consequences flow from this situation: on
the one hand, there is the need for formal rules on
public expenditure that impose intertemporal dis-
cipline on governments. Moreover, there is a need
for regular assessment of programmes and poli-
cies, both ex-ante and ex-post, so as to provide
checks on the promises of social benefits which
give a reason for their existence and identify who
gains and who loses from the intervention.
2. Flexible market functioning conducive to
competition is fundamental for an efficient alloca-
tion of resources. The existence of restrictions to
entry into industries or professions is a common
form of ensuring economic rents to those who are
already established, at the cost of social well being.
These restrictions are frequently presented as
being in defence of “the public interest”. As with
our comment on the actions of governments, we
should not be naive about this. For these reasons,
the activity of regulatory structures (specifically
the Competition Authority), with a scope possibly
extended to the professional associations, can
make an important contribution to economic
growth.
REFERENCES
Blanchard, O and P. Portugal. “What hides behind
an Unemployment rate: comparing the Portu-
guese and US labor markets” American Eco-
nomic Review, 91(1), 2001.
Cardoso, A.R. “Wage differentials across firms: an
application of multilevel modelling” Journal
of Applied Econometrics, 15(4), 2000.
Cardoso, A.R. and P. Portugal. “Bargained wages,
wage drift and de design of the wage setting
system”. IZADiscussion Paper 941, 2003.
OECD, Economic Surveys, Portugal, 1992.
Tavares, J. “Firms, Financial Markets and the Law:
Institutions and Economic Growth in Portu-
gal”. Proceedings of 1st Banco de Portugal
Conference on “Desenvolvimento Económico
Português no Espaço Europeu: Determinantes e
Políticas”, 2002.
Banco de Portugal / Economic bulletin / March 2004 59
Articles